Nickerson Pump & Machinery Co., Inc. v. State Tax Commission of Utah : Brief of Plaintiff by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Nickerson Pump & Machinery Co., Inc. v. State Tax
Commission of Utah : Brief of Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kent Shearer; Earl M. Wunderli; Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nickerson Pump & Machinery Co. v. State Tax Comm. Of Utah, No. 9353 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3822
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
F-1 LED 
NICKERSON PUMP & MACHINERY ______ _ 
'JV 2 ,]196Q 
CO., INC., Plaintiff,c: r~-.- £-~-.;;:~-~~ c~-~-;,:-·:c~:~-i;------~ 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
9353 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Kent Shearer 
Earl M. Wunderli 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 1 
1. Nature of the case ------------------------------------------------------ 1 
2. Evidentary facts of record ---------------------------------------- 4 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 12 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------ ____ _ ___ 12 
I. Plaintiff does not consume pumps ---------------------------- 12 
A. Both sales tax and use tax are taxes on the con-
sumer. ______________ ------------------------------------------------------ 12 
B. Utah decisions provide definition of the term 
''consumer. ------------------------------------------------------------ 14 
C. Plaintiff is not a consumer of pumps-buyers 
from it are. ------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
D. Plaintiff emplaces pumps at cost -------------------------- 20 
E. Plaintiff is not a consumer under defendant's 
regulations. ----------------· ------------------------------------------- 21 
1. Defendant lacks power to impose tax on a 
consumer. ---------------------------------------------------------- 21 
2. The commission's regulations do not apply 
retroactive! y. --------------------------------------- _______________ 2 3 
3. Plaintiff sells both under lump sum and non 
lump sum contracts. ------------------------------------------ 27 
4. Defendant's regulations do not purport to 
make plaintiff a consumer. -------------------------------- 28 
5. Defendant's theory does not make plaintiff a 
consumer. ------------------------------------------------------------ 3 3 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
6. Defendant erred in not allowing cross-exami-
nation and not admitting Exhibit 15 for identi-
fication. _________________ --------------------------------------------- 3 5 
II. Penalties were improperly assessed. ____________________________ 36 
A. Plaintiff was neither negligent nor intentionally 
disregardful of authorized rules and regulations 
with knowledge thereof·---------------------------------------- 36 
H. Defendant erred in not allowing cross-examina-
tion and not admitting Exhibit 15 for identifi-
cation. -------------------------------------------------------------------- 39 
III. Certain items of the assessment were incorrectly im-
posed. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40 
CON CL USIO N ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 42 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Ct:t. v. Morgan, 42 Kan. 23, 21 Pac. 
809 ( 1889) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 33 
Bay State York Co. v. Marvix, 331 Mass. 407, 119 N.E. 2d 
727, 43 A.L.R. 2d 1373 (1954) ------------------------------------ 32 
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 
168 P. 2d 324 ( 1946) -------------------------------------------------- 13 
Ford J. Twaits Co. v. State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 
148 P. 2d 343 ( 1944) -------------------------------------------------- 13 
Francom v. State Tax Commission, No. 9271 (Utah, 1960)-- 13 
Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 
842 ( 195 7) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 
209 P. 2d 208 ( 1949) ---------------------------------------------------- 13 
Howe v. Tax Commission, 10 Utah 2d 362, 353 P. 2d 468 
( 1960) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
McKendrick v. State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 
p. 2d 177 ( 1959) ---------------------------------------------------------- 21 
Pender v. Alix, ____ Utah ____ , 354 P. 2d 1066 (1960) ---------- 7 
Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah 535, 26 P. 2d 328 (1936) ------ 4 
Toronto v. Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P. 2d 954, 600 
( 19&0) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 30 
Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 
Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164 ( 1946); modified on rehearing 
110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 ( 1947) ____ 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 
Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 
101 Utah 513, 125 P. 2d 408 (1942) 
--------------------------------------------14, 15, 18, 19, 22, 31, 32, 33 
Washington Printing & Binding Co. v. State, 192 Wash. 
448, 73 p. 2d 1326 ( 193 7) ------------------------------------ 20, 23 
\Y/ estern Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
87 Utah 227, 48 P.2d 526 (1935)---- 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, 42 
Workman v. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033, 58 
A.L.R. 1346 ( 1928) -------------------------------------------------------- 34 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 
2d 242, 291 P. 2d 900 ( 1955) -------------------------------------- 20 
STATUTES 
Laws of Utah 
1933, Chapter 63 ------------------------------------------------------------ 14 
1933, (2nd SS), Chapter 20 ---------------------------------------- 16 
193 5, Chapter 91 ------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
193 7, Chapter 110 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
193 7, Chapter 114 ---------------------------------------------------------- 14 
1939, Chapter 103 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
1943, Chapter 92 ------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
1949, Chapter 83 ------------------------------------------------------------ 16 
1955, Chapter 126 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
111 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
195 7, Chapter 12 5 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
195 7, Chapter 128 ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
Section 59-15-2 -------------------------------------------------------- 14, 28 
Section 5 9-15-6 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Section 59-15-8 -------------------------------------------------------- 36, 41 
Section 59-15-14 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Section 59-15-15 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Section 59-15-16 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Section 59-16-3 ----------------------------------------------------------=----- 13 
Section 59-16-4 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
Section 59-16-9 __ -------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
Section 59-16-11 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Section 59-16-12 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Section 59-16-13 -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
Section 60-2-3 ( 4) (a) --------~--------------------------------------------- 41 
Utah Code Annotated, 1959 Supp. 
Section 59-15-4 (b) ( 1) ( 2) (e) (f) (g) -------------------------- 13 
TEXTS AND TREATISES 
American Jurisprudence 
Volume 20, Evidence, Section 3 34 -------------------------------- 36 
Volume 22, Fixtures, Sections 49, 55, 61, 77 ____________ 30, 32 
American Law Reports 
Volume 55 (2nd Series), page 1044 ________________________ 30, 32 
Corpus Juris Secundum 
Volume 73, Public Administrative Bodies and Proce-
dure, Section 15 2, p. 486 ------------------------------------------------ 4 
Volume 73, Public Administrative Bodies and Proce-
dure, Section 107, pp. 429-30 ---------------------------------------- 23 
Jones on Evidence (Fifth Edition), Volume 1, Section 192-- 40 
Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 5, pages 2662-64 ____________ 4 
Webster's New International Dictionary ________________ 14, 16, 17 
\'Vords and Phrases, Permanent Edition 10, Volume 9 ____ 16, 17 
IV 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREl~llE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICKERSON PUMP & MACHINERY 
CO., INC., Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
9353 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. 
Nature of the Case 
This is an original proceeding, initiated pursuant to 
59-15-14, 15 and 16 and 59-16-11- 13 UCA (1953), wherein 
plaintiff challenges the validity of a deficiency tax assessment 
imposed (R. 108, Ex. 1) and affirmed (R. 126-129) by 
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defendant. 1 The assessment is based upon fourteen transactions 
wherein plaintiff sold and emplaced water pumps for gov-
ernmental units exempted from sales tax liability. 
The primary issue is whether plaintiff is the consumer of 
water pump assemblies sold and emplaced by it under contracts 
specifying a single price for pump and emplacement. Defendant 
says it is, and-as to parts of such assemblies-that plaintiff 
should be charged with use or sales tax depending upon whether 
title passed within or without Utah. 
If this Court adopts defendant's position (thereby over-
ruling, or at least modifying, past Utah decisions), two sub-
sidiary issues arise: whether various items within the assessment 
were correctly included; and whether defendant properly im-
posed penalties (including interest at 12% per annum). These 
subsidiary issues will require consideration of areas in which 
defendant's decision departs from stipulations at formal hearing. 
By paragraph 3 of its petition for Writ of Certiorari and 
for Review, plaintiff also has complained of evidentiary rulings 
at formal hearing before defendant (note particularly R. 36-3 7, 
74-76, 122, Ex. 15). 
The amount of tax in question, while considerable, is not 
staggering. Despite this, a decision favorable to defendant 
would, as precedent, have important economic consequences. 
In the short view, it would subject all other Utah water pump 
lNo objection is lodged against the imposition of the sales tax specified at 
Exhibit A, Schedule 1 of the deficiency notice, as amended, amounting to $56.00 
plus interest; as to such segment, however, plaintiff protests the imposition of 
penalties (including interest at 12% per annum). It will be noted that the 
credit to plaintiff for bad de~ts exceeds the tax deficiency hereby conceded. If 
bad debts are set-off only agamst tax deficiencies arising in the same year the 
conceded deficiency is $4.84 plus interest at 6% per annum. ' 
12 
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dealers to deficiency assessments-complete with interest and 
penalties-of the type here challenged.2 Patently, this would 
constitute, in arid Utah, a large sum. The gain to the State 
would be diminished somewhat by the cost of auditing the 
books of other dealers and by claims for refund of sales tax 
erroneously collected by such dealers from private lump-sum 
buyers on the assumption that the buyers were consumers. In 
the long term, the revenue of the State would be reduced. 
Governmental units would insist that separate contracts be 
entered into for, respectively, sale and emplacement. Other-
wise, the cost to the unit would be increased by the cost of 
the sales and use tax paid by the dealer; that cost, of course, 
would be passed on to any lump-sum public buyer.3 But private 
persons would insist that water pump purchases be made under 
lump-sum contracts. In this manner, they would absorb only 
the tax paid by the dealer and passed on to them rather than 
the tax on the sales price to them. This would afford private 
buyers an advantage in that their actual cost would be reduced 
by the amount of the sales and use tax percentage (currently 
2% or 2V2%) times the dealer's mark-up over wholesale. 
Plaintiff has assigned (Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 
for Review, par. 3) as error the incompleteness of defendant's 
findings (R. 126-128), and ~ the fact that they express bare 
ultimate conclusions of law. It is apparent from their reading 
2Defendant excluded some evidence of trade practice (R. 36-37, 74-75, 122, 
Ex. 15). The testimony of witnesses Nickerson, Richards, Templeton and Hilbert 
however, establishes that there has been uniform treatment by the industry (R: 
66-67, 68-69, 72, 77-78, 95). If there be any doubt of this, it is negated by the 
firm assurances of public buyers that tax payments were not requisite (R. 44-
46, 74, 109-110, Ex. 2-3; R. 118-119, Ex. 11-12), which assurances seemingly 
were buttressed by the then practical interpretation of defendants (R. 63, 97-98). 
3Such procedure has been used subsequent to service of the instant assessment 
(R. 47). 
·3 
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and a comparison of them with plaintiff's pleading (R. 13-16) 
that such findings do not approach adequacy, see Thomas v. 
Farrell, 82 Utah 535, 26 P.2d 328, 330 (1936); 73 C.J.S.J 
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 152 at page 486. 
Inasmuch as full appellate understanding of the questions 
presented may be had from a reading of the pleadings and 
record, plaintiff does not urge that remand to defendant for 
proper findings is requisite, 5 Moore's Federal Practice 2662-64. 
The true significance of the inadequacy of defendant's 
findings is that they are reflective of the inadequacy of defend-
ant's determination. 
2. 
Evidentiary Facts of Record 
At formal hearing, defendant produced two witnesses, 
Paul M. Holt, its chief auditor, (R. 20-29) and A. C. Goates, 
its audit supervisor, (R. 97-98). Plaintiff called an adverse 
witness, William H. Buttalph, the commission auditor initially 
responsible for the instant deficiency assessment, (R. 30-41). 
Plaintiffs case-in-chief consisted of the testimony, largely 
stipulated, of R. H. Nickerson, its president, (R. 41-66; R. 
75-97), A. Z. Richards, Sr. (R. 66-70) and Win Templeton 
(R. 70-73), both civil engineers specializing in the development 
of water wells and whose firms were responsible for the drawing 
of specifications for a substantial proportion of the sales here 
in question, and of Robert Hilbert, manager of the Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District, (R. 73-74). In addition, 
17 exhibits were admitted, one rejected (R. 108-125). 
The facts elicited were, in large measure, undisputed. In 
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those cases where dispute, real or imagined, existed, plaintiff 
will support its recitation by footnote. 
Plaintifi and its predecessor sole proprietorship and partner-
ship have been in the business for about thirty-six years. It is 
a dealer in pumping and allied equipment, specializing in water 
pumps. At all times here important, it held a Utah retail sales 
license (R. 42). 
Three types of pumps are sold by it: submersible deep 
well pumps, deep well line shaft pumps, and booster pumps 
(R. 47). The former two types service wells which range in 
depth up to 1,000 feet; the wells in question are between 400 
and 700 feet deep (R. 78). A pamphlet regarding submersible 
deep well pumps was introduced as Exhibit 7 (R. 114). Their 
distinguishing characteristic is that their motor is below water 
level, at the end of the pump shaft (R. 49) . A pamphlet 
regarding deep well line shaft pumps was introduced as Ex-
hibit 6 (R. 113) . Their distinguishing characteristic is that 
their motor is on the top of the pump, at or about ground 
level (R. 49). Such pumps will produce from 200 to 4,500 
gallons of culinary water per minute (R. 78, 92). Such pumps, 
including their extension pipes, range in weight from 700 
pounds up to eighteen tons (R. 81) . The deep well line shaft 
may be either water or oil cooled (R. 80-81). A pamphlet 
regarding booster pumps was introduced as Exhibit 9 (R. 116). 
While the purpose of deep well pumps is to bring water from 
a well to a water line, the purpose of a booster pump is to 
give pressure to the water as it goes thorugh the line (R. 52) . 
The booster pump is connected to the pipes at ground level 
(R. 52, 116, Ex. 9, p. 7). Plaintiff assembles booster pumps 
prior to emplacement (R. 51). 
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Because of the weight and bulk of the pumps, buyers are 
unable to emplace them in wells. As a "necessary evil" of the 
business of selling pumps, plaintiff emplaces them in the 
majority of instances. Plaintiff owns and operates a crane for 
the purpose of emplacing deep well pumps. Emplacement is 
not a profit item, being done at cost. Those of plaintiff's com-
petitors who do not have the facilities for emplacement hire 
subcontractors to do so (R. 43, 73, 77-78). 
Plaintiff and its competitors sell and emplace both for 
public and private buyers. Some 70% of plaintiff's sales are 
to private individuals. In none of its dealings, private or public, 
is there an express agreement as to whether the pump assembly, 
after emplacement, will be realty or personalty (R. 75-76). 
The security device used by plaintiff on private sales is the 
title retaining or conditional sales contract, under which it 
has effected repossessions. It has never filed a mechanic's lien 
(R. 44,75). Both plaintiff and its competitors charge sales 
tax to private persons. When a lump sum contract is used, 
sales tax on the entire amount, including installation, is charged 
private buyers, as required by defendant's regulations (R. 43-44, 
46-47, 67-68, 102-105). Auditor Buttloph did not object to 
plaintiffs method of dealing with private contracts, although 
the collection of sales tax, rather than the payment of use 
tax, on plaintiff's lump sum contracts with private buyers would 
be improper under defendant's theory.4 
4Defenda~t may disp_ute this statem~nt. Although auditor Buttalph's testimony 
was, admrttedly, evasrv: and co_ntradrctory, the following is dear: (a) according 
to bot~ Buttalph_ a~d. hrs supenor, Holt, Buttalph _covered_ all public and private 
sales nles of plamtlff ( R. 24, 30-31) ; (b) plamtrff has tiled no use tax return ( R:· 31-32, 34) _; (c) according to Bu_tto.lph, plaintiff owed no tax upon its 
pnv_a~e transactwns (R. 33, ~5). Plamtdf concludes that auditqr Buttalph's 
aud1t111g en~eavors were practtcal, not c<?nceptualistic, that the test employed 
was one of mcreased revenue rather than mcreased consistency, and that auditor 
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Plaintiff's contracts with public buyers likewise are both 
separate and lump sum (R. 44, 90). In this connection it will 
be noted that defendant amended its assessment to delete 
certain non lump sum contracts (R. 108, Ex. 1, page 4), and 
that one of the sales here involved, Midvale City, No. 8833, 
was not under a lump sum contract (R. 60-61). Plaintiff, 
considering that the buyer-not it-consumes pumps, and in 
view of the fact that public buyers are exempt from sales tax, 
has not charged sales tax to such buyers nor has it paid use 
tax (R. 44). 
The usual chronology of plaintiff's sales is as follows: 
1. The engineer for the buyer, public or private, prepares 
an invitation to bid and specifications, outlining in detail the 
type or types of pumps needed, and whether or not a lump 
sum bid is sought (R. 46, 66, 70, 79). Examples of specifi-
cations appear as Exhibits 3, 16 and 17 (R. 110, 123-124). 
2. Plaintiff bids according to the specifications. Prior to 
making its bid, plaintiff prepares a computation sheet which 
is retained in its files. This computation sheet shows clearly 
the cost of labor added to the bid. This cost, not a profit item, 
is computed on the basis of $90.00 per day, for the emplacing 
equipment and a crew of two to three men. This cost is not 
a variable item-expected profit, not cost items such as emplace-
ment, are reduced if competition demands (R. 43, 46-47, 
90-91). 
3. If the contract is awarded it, plaintiff then orders the 
specified pumps and ancillary equipment from its suppliers. 
Buttolph's activities and testimony are an example of "the edacious minotaur, 
tax", referred to in a recent dissenting opinion, Pender v. Alix, .... Utah ----, 
354 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1960). 
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Plaintiff normally does not store pumps. All such suppliers 
either are wholesalers or supply plaintiff at wholesale prices. 
Byron Jackson deep well and Aurora booster pumps are specialty 
goods, manufactured to specification. The goods are shipped 
either to plaintiff or the well site. Except for Cutler Hammer, 
shipping costs are prepaid by the seller. Byron Jackson specifies 
that title passes f.o.b. factory, California, but no other seller 
specifies where or when title passes. Resale certificates are 
given in-state sellers, but not out-of-state sellers (R. 55, 93-95). 
4. Prior to emplacement of deep well pumps, the buyer, 
acting individually or through an independent contractor other 
than plaintiff, digs and lines the water well with casing (R. 47, 
49, 78-79) . The cost of the buyer's digging the wells, de-
fendant's counsel elicited, is $1.10 to $1.20 per foot per inch 
of diameter (R. 78). The buyer, not plaintiff, also builds a 
concrete foundation around the mouth of the well, and builds 
a water line extending toward the pump (R. 47-48, 81, 82). 
Exhibits 4 and 5 show a water well prepared for emplacement 
(R. 48, 111-112). 
5. In the emplacement of a deep well pump, plaintiffs 
crane lowers it and its pipe into the prepared well. As the 
pump base or platform reaches the prepared foundation, 
plaintiff is careful to align it, making it plumb. This is done 
by grouting the foundation with cement to even it. Plaintiff 
lubricates the pump base or platform so that it will not be 
cemented to the foundation, such cementing being "the last 
thing you would want." If a submersible pump is used, a 
specially prepared cable is also lowered into the well to furnish 
power to the motor. If a well is flowing, tending to seep, 
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the pump platform is bolted to a flange attached to the well 
casing, thereby "sealed." This is not done if the well does not 
flow. On occasion, plaintiff bolts an electric panel to a near-by 
wall and attaches the pump's cable to it; all pumps here 
involved use electric power. The outlet of the pump is attached, 
perhaps by a metal band, to the buyer's main (R. 48-51, 81-86, 
93, 95) . Exhibits 6-8 illustrate the emplacement of pumps 
(R. 113-115). 
6. A booster pump is emplaced and bolted on a cement 
foundation and attached to pipes prepared for its connection 
by the buyer (R. 51-52). Exhibit 9, page 7 illustrates an em-
placed booster pump (R. 51, 116). 
7. The engineers in charge supervise the emplacement 
of all pumps (R. 67, 70). The pumps, after emplacement, 
retain their identity as pumps (R. 55-56). 
8. Plaintiff does not ever use the pump to pump water. 
The buyer does this (R. 54). 
Detailed descriptions of each transaction here involved 
are contained at R. 56-63. Each, except Midvale City, No. 
8833, was performed under a lump sum contract; the exception 
concerns a pump sold without any agreement whatever for 
emplacement, and an agreement three months later that plaintiff 
would emplace such pump (R. 60-61, 120, Ex. 13). On the 
lump sum contracts, plaintiff's computation sheets show that 
the percentage of labor cost in the contract price ranged from 
2.7% (Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District deep 
well line shaft 10703, R. 62) to 6.8% (Logan City Corporation, 
9282, R. 62). The following transactions involved submersible 
deep well pumps in non-flowing wells which, therefore, were 
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not bolted to a flange: Midvale City, 8271; Tooele, 8603; 
Metropolitan Water District, 92 3 7. The following transactions 
involved submersible pumps which were so bolted: University 
of Utah, 8541; Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, 
8921; City of Fillmore, 9164; Salt Lake County Water Con-
servancy District, 9067; South Salt Lake City, 10481. The 
following transactions involved deep well line shaft pumps, 
all so bolted: Town of North Salt Lake, 8596; Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District, 10703. The following 
transactions involved booster pumps: Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District, 8921; Logan City Corporation, 9282; 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 10703. 
Plaintiffs case was, thus, presented by the testimony or 
stipulated testimony of representatives of the parties to the 
usual transaction of sale, the dealer (Mr. Nickerson), the 
buyer (Mr. Hilbert) and the consulting engineer (Mr. Richards 
and Mr. Templeton). The testimony of each was demonstrative 
of the fact that the parties do not, and could not reasonably, 
intend that pump assemblies become permanent additions 
to the well, the pipes or to the realty upon which they are 
situate (R. 53-54, 67-68, 71-74, 79-80, 86-87). First, pumps 
are quite often removed for repair. Such repair is not at all 
unusual in this area, where wells tend to be sandy. It is im-
possible to repair any deep well or the motor of a submersible 
without removing the pump from the well. The surface motor 
of a line shaft pump may be repaired while the pump remains 
in the well. Repair is more likely for the pump than for the 
motor inasmuch as the pump's bearings, spaced every ten feet, 
are subjected to considerable wear. Assuming optimum con-
ditions (no sandy or hard water), seldom extant in Utah, 
10 
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the maximum life of a pump is 20 years. It is recommended 
that, even though no difficulty is apparent in its operation, a 
deep well pump be removed every 5-7 years for a preventive 
maintenance check (R. 53, 67, 71, 73, 79-80, 86-87). Secondly, 
deep well pumps are removed when repair to the well or well 
lining is required (R. 53, 673). Third, pumps are removed 
when the well's potential is exhausted (R. 71). Fourth, pumps 
are removed when it is desired to develop the facility in 
question to its full potential. It is usual for a well to be 
developed by the engineer in charge to a given potential and 
to emplace a pump with a lesser potential. This is because the 
area to be served may not, at the time of emplacement, have 
need for the well's full potential. As the need increases, the 
former pump is removed, and either used elsewhere or traded 
in. A given well can receive various sized pumps. An example 
of this procedure is JMidvale City, No. 8276, one of the trans-
actions here in question (R. 53-54, 56, 67, 71, 74, 95). Fifth, 
if the user has more than one facility, pumps are removed 
and interchanged to make use more fully of the potential of 
all facilities (R. 54, 71, 74). The need for removal is equivalent 
as between deep well and booster pumps (R. 72). 
In view of the frequency of pump removal, water engineers 
such as Mr. Richards and Mr. Templeton design projects to 
facilitate pump removal (R. 67, 71). If a pumphouse is 
erected before or after the emplacement of the pump, it is 
invariably5 designed with a hatch to facilitate emplacement 
5Auditor Buttolph, who professed knowledge of the pumping business, although 
he hadn't visited the sites in question, or interviewed the engineers or buyers 
involved in the subject transactions, would prefer the word "sometimes" (R. 
35-38). L will be remembered, in evaluating his credibility, that it is Buttalph's 
assessment which is in question. 
11 
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and removal (R. 52, 67, 71). No damage is caused to the 
real estate when the pump is removed, and it or a replacement 
pump may be emplaced in the same manner as were the well 
virgin. An example, once again, is Midvale City, No. 8276. 
Removal consists of unbolting and lifting the pump; the only 
thing broken is, perhaps, an inexpensive band on the connection 
between the pump and the water main (R. 54, 56, 67-68). 
Exhibit 10 illustrates the removal of a pump from a pump 
house (R. 53, 117}. 
In order to avoid duplication, the testimony of defendant's 
witnesses as to the propriety of penalties (including 12% 
per annum interest) will be deferred until the appropriate 
portion of plaintiff's argument, as will defendant's departure 
from two at-hearing stipulated amendments to the deficiency 
assessment. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. Plaintiff does not consume pumps. 
II. Penalties were improperly assessed. 
III. Certain items of the assessment were incorrectly 
imposed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT CONSUME PUMPS. 
A. 
BOTH SALES TAX AND USE TAX ARE TAXES ON THE CONSUMER. 
12 
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Sales tax is a levy upon the consumer of personal property, 
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 
P 2d 324, 326 ( 1946). So is use tax, 59-16-3, UCA ( 195 3). 
The two taxes are correlative and complementary, the latter 
having been passed for the purpose of removing "the thereto-
fore existing discrimination in favor of out-of-state merchants," 
Union Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commission, 
110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164 ( 1946), modified on rehearing, 
110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879, 881 (1947); Geneva Steel Co. 
v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 2d 208 ( 1949). 
If goods are purchased in-state by a consumer, the sales tax 
applies, see Western Leather & Finding Co. v. Sales Tax Com-
mission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 ( 1935). If goods are 
purchased out-of-state by an in-state consumer and no tax is 
owing or has been paid previously, the use tax applies, Ford 
f. Twaits Co. v. State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 
P. 2d 343 (1944). 
The key term is "consumer."6 If plaintiff, in sale and 
emplacement, is a consumer, it should pay tax on materials 
to be consumed-sales tax if title to the materials passes to 
it in this state, use tax if title passes out of state. If a private 
buyer of a pump assembly is the consumer, he should pay 
sales tax. If a public buyer of a pump assembly is the consumer, 
no tax is paid because of the exemption provided by 59-15-6 
6We are not here concerned with the sales tax on certain "services," 59-15-4 
(b)(1) (2) (e) (f) (g), UCA (1959 Supp.), a fact of which defendant's counsel 
at hearing apparently was not fully aware (R. 77). Nor does plaintiff, in this 
case, dest*:e the power of the legislature to impose a tax upon any "service" it 
may perform in the emplacement of pump assemblies, Howe v. Tax Commission, 
10 Utah 2d 362, 353 P.2d 468 (1960); Francom v. State Tax Commission, 
No. 9271 (Utah, 1960). Plaintiff simply contends that it is not a consumer 
within the meaning of the tax laws currently applicable to its business. 
13 
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UCA (1953) as implemented by Sales Tax Regulation 54 
(R. 103-104). 
Put another way: if, in the transactions here involved, 
plaintiff consumed the pump assemblies7 in question, it is 
subject to sales or use tax, whether the buyer is private or 
public. If, on the other hand, the buyer is the consumer, private 
buyers should pay sales tax (to be collected by the seller) and 
public buyers should pay no tax at all. 
B. 
UTAH DECISIONS PROVIDE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "CON-
SUMER." 
On three occasions since legislative imposition of the sales 
tax, L. 1933, ch. 63, this Court has had occasion to define the 
meaning of the term "consumer," Western Leather & Finding 
Co., supra; Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Com-
mission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); Union Portland 
Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 
P.2d 164 ( 1946), two of which were decided after enactment 
of the original use tax, L. 193 7, ch. 114. 
In Western Leather & Finding Co., defendant had assessed 
plaintiff with sales tax liability for leather and shoe findings 
sold by it to Utah shoe repairers. After noting that plaintiff 
was liable only if the repairers were "consumers," this Court 
turned, at 48 P.2d 528, to Webster's New International Dic-
tionary for the definition of "consume": 
7The process of assembling the pumps from component parts is a "manufactur-
ing" or "ccnnpounding for sale" within the meaning of 59-15-2 and 59-16-4, 
UCA (1953), hence not taxable as consumption. 
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"1. To destroy the substance of, esp. by fire;-for-
merly and still figuratively used of any destructive or 
wasting process, as evaporation, decomposition, and 
disease. 2. To spend wastefully; hence, to use up; 
expend; waste. 3. To use up (time) whether waste-
fully or usefully; as, hours consumed in reading. 4. To 
eat or drink up (food); devour. 5. To waste or burn 
away; to perish. Syn.-absorb, spend, squander, dissi-
pate." 
It was then held: 
"A person who places shoes, heels, and patches on 
old shoes does not consume material within the defi-
nitions above quoted or within the meaning of the 
statute. The consumer is the person who wears the 
shoes after they are repaired.'' 
In Utah Concrete Products Corp., sale tax was held to be 
applicable to purchases by road and building contractors from 
a supplier of concrete pipe, cinder blocks and related products. 
Such pipe, blocks and products were incorporated "as one of 
many units which go to make up buildings, structures, or roads," 
id at 125 P. 2d 410. This Court noted that the road and 
building contractors did not purchase the products 
"for reselling them as such in their original form, 
but for the purpose of changing their very nature from 
personal to real property. In short, labor and many 
other materials enter along with the plaintiffs' (the 
suppliers') products to make up the particular structure, 
and they are all used or consumed in the process of 
producing a new entity." id. (Emphasis supplied). 
This Court held, therefore, that road and building " (c) on-
tractors are consumers within the meaning of our act because 
they are the last persons in the chain to deal with such products 
15 
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before incorporation into a separate entity and before such 
products lost their identity as such ... " id at 125 P. 2d 411. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
In Union Portland Cement Co.} a plaintiff-manufacturer 
was held to be liable for use tax on iron grinding balls, fire-
brick and coal utilized in the manufacture of plaintiffs products. 
This Court, speaking through the same Justice as in Utah Con-
crete Products Corp. in answer to the problem of who was the 
consumer cited the definition from Webster's relied upon in 
Western Leather & Finding} supra. Also quoted, at 170 P.2d 
171, was 9 Words and Phrases} Permanent Edition 10 delineat-
ing a "consumer" as: "one who uses economic goods and so 
diminishes or destroys their utilities; opposed to producer; 
and 'consume' means to use up, expend, waste, devour, with 
synonyms destroy, swallow up, engulf, absorb, waste, exhaust, 
spend, expend, squander, lavish, dissipate, burn up." Liability 
was imposed because the materials in question were worn away 
in the manufacturing process. 
Although the Legislature has devoted regular attention 
to the sales and use tax acts, amending the definitions sections 
by L. 1933 (2nd SS), ch. 20; L. 1935, ch. 91; L. 1937, ch. 
110; L. 1939 ch. 103; L. 1943, ch. 92; L. 1949, ch. 83; L. 1955, 
ch. 126; L. 1957, ch. 125, 128, it has not deemed it requisite 
to modify this Court's understanding of the meaning of the term 
·'consumer.'' 
C. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A CONSUMER OF PUMPS-BUYERS FROM IT 
ARE. 
16 
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A cursory reading of the statement of evidentiary facts 
demonstrates that plaintiff, in the transactions in question, was 
not a consumer. 
By the test enunciated by Webster, and reflected by West-
ern Leather & Finding Co. and Union Portland Cement Co., 
plaintiff did not consume the pumps in question. By definition, 
a water pump pumps water. That is its purpose, its use, its 
reason for existence. Plaintiff does not pump water from the 
water pump it em places (R. 54). In consequence, plaintiff 
does not, in em placing: ( 1) destroy the substance of a pump; 
(2) spend the pump; (3) use up the pump; ( 4) devour the 
pump; (5) waste the pump. It is the buyer (in these trans-
actions, a public body) which, through its use of the water 
pump to pump water, causes the substance of the pump to 
be destroyed, spends the pump, uses up the pump, devours 
the pump and wastes the pump. A water pump of the type 
here involved has a maximum useful life of 20 years (R. 79) . 
Its use, in the well in which emplaced or in other wells, starts 
after, does not end with, emplacement. 
By the test enunciated by Words and Phrases and reflected 
by Union Portland Cement Company, plaintiff is, for like 
reason, not a consumer. Plaintiff, by emplacement, is not 
"one who uses economic goods and so diminishes or destroys 
their utilities." Quite the contrary. Plaintiff, in emplacing 
pumps, activates their utilities-a water pump out of water 
has no utility. The utility of a water pump is destroyed in 20 
years at most, through use by the buyer. Equally, plaintiff, in 
emplacing the pump, does not use it up, expend it, waste it, 
devour it, destroy it, swallow it up, engulf it, absorb it, waste 
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it, exhaust it, spend it, expend it, squander it, lavish it, dissipate 
it, or burn it up. There is no evidence that plaintiff does so. 
There is every evidence that the buyer from plaintiff, through 
its utilization of it, does so. Utah Portland Cement Company 
is instructive, it should be added, for its analogy of the iron 
grinding balls, firebrick and coal there involved to manu-
facturing machinery, id at 170 P.2d 172. It is patent that this 
Court there considered that machinery was consumed in its 
use as machinery and not in its emplacement in the manufac-
turing plant. 
By the test enunciated in Utah Concrete Products Corp., 
plaintiff did not consume the pumps in question. Pumps are 
not, as are pipe, blocks and like products incorporated "as 
one of many units which go to make up buildings, structures 
or roads,'' changed in their very nature. They are sold as pumps. 
They remain pumps. They are not permanently incorporated into 
the well. As contrasted with products going into a roadway, 
wear on the pump does not directly affect the well. On this, 
the testimony is undisputed. ( 1) Pumps are quite often removed 
for repair to the pump. ( 2) Pumps are removed for repair of 
the well. ( 3) Pumps are removed when a well's potential is 
exhausted. ( 4) Pumps are removed when another pump is to 
be emplaced in order to develop the well's potential to its 
fullest. ( 5) Pumps are removed to exchange them with other 
pumps. At most, the life span of a pump is 20 years, and in 
Utah probably much less (by way of illustration, a common 
law adverse possessor taking possession of a well one week 
after the emplacement of a pump, would not own the well 
before the pump-if it were allowed to remain-was spent; 
lest one think of statutory adverse possession, let it be remem-
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bereJ that it is recommended that pumps be removed at least 
every five to seven years for preventive maintenance) . These 
are not mere possibilities of removal. Removal is sufficiently 
probable that consulting engineers plan wells and pumphouses 
to facilitate removal (R. 52, 67, 71). In emplacement, pumps 
do not lose their identity as such. They are not incorporated 
into a separate entity. Emplacement is certainly not for the 
purpose of changing the very nature of pumps from personal 
to real property in the process of producing a new entity. Once 
again the matter of planned removability arises. Engineers 
plan for it, plaintiff plans for it (taking care, for instance, to 
lubricate the pump platform so that it will not stick to the 
cement grouting on the foundation-R. 83), and the buyer 
plans for it (anticipating the trading in or exchange of pumps) . 
It follows that pumps, through emplacement, are not .. used 
or consumed in the process of producing a new entity," id at 
125 P.2d 410.8 Plaintiff is not a consumer. 
Plaintiff is aware that the conclusions (labeled findings) 
of defendant's decision purport to determine that it is a con-
sumer. Such conclusions are at odds with the undisputed 
evidentiary facts. The language of Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, 
6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P.2d 842, 846 (1957), is appropriate: 
"Notwithstanding the fact that considerable tolerance must 
SAuditor Buttolph hazarded that a pump was much like a window or a door. 
Although no evidence as to the reasons for removing windows was presented, 
Auditor Buttolph suggested that they would be removed more often than would 
pumps (R. 39). It is suggested that, in his testimony to this effect, Auditor 
Buttolph was, in the common experience of reasonable men, ( 1) mistaken; 
(2) experiencing a temporary mental lapse. His analogy of working machinery 
to doors and windows is for instance most peculiar when one considers the need 
for repairs alone. How many windows and doors are traded in? How many 
windows and doors are exchanged from one opening to another? Few, if any. 
But the uncontradicted testimony of experts is that these are common experiences 
with pumps. 
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be indulged in favor of the findings of the trial court because 
of its advantaged position in immediate contact with the trial 
and the parties, it nevertheless may not obdurately refuse to 
find facts which are established by credible and uncontradicted 
evidence." What was true in Fuller is doubly true here, where 
the evidence was largely a result of stipulated testimony and 
where the ":finder" was, in reality, the adverse party. 
D. 
PLAINTIFF EMPLACES PUMPS AT COST. 
The undisputed evidence is that plaintiff's emplacement 
of pumps is not a profit item, but rather is done at cost as a 
necessary evil of its business. The pumps are of considerable 
size and buyers (even one of the importance of Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District) do not have the truck 
and crane necessary for emplacement and removal. 
It is well established that the primary nature of a concern's 
business, not incidental factors entering into the conduct of 
such business, will determine tax liability. Thus in Washington 
Printing & Binding Co. v. State, 192 Wash. 448, 73 P.2d 1326 
(1937), the Washington Supreme Court held that the tax-
payer, a printer, performed essentially a service although the 
state argued that it was "selling" the products of its presses. 
In Young Electric Sign Co. v. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah 
2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 ( 1955), this Court ruled that, where an 
electric company's total charges for repairs to signs now owned 
by it included parts and material costing such company only 
6% of the total bill, such furnishing of parts and materials 
was incidental and the service charges, including the cost of 
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parts and materials, were not subject to sales tax. In !vic Kendrick 
·v. Stc~te Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1959), 
this Court affirmed the determination of defendant that the 
services of an artificial limb manufacturer were incidental to 
the sale of such limbs. 
In the instant case, it is obvious that the service performed 
by plaintiff is incidental to its business of selling pumps. No 
particular skill, just manual labor, is required in emplacement. 
Emplacement is performed at cost as a "necessary evil" of 
the business. A very small percentage of the total sales price 
(2.7% to 6.8%) is attributable to emplacement cost. 
From computation sheets prepared by plaintiff prior to 
bid, the cost of the labor item can be readily ascertained. De-
fendant's apparent emphasis upon lump sum contracts 1s, 
therefore, highly unrealistic. 
Plaintiff submits, therefore, that any service performed by 
it is at cost and is merely incidental to its primary business of 
selling pumps.9 
E. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A CONSUMER UNDER DEFENDANT'S REGU-
LATIONS. 
1. 
Defendant Lacks Power to Impose Tax on a Non-Consumer. 
It is dubious that, in view of exhaustive judicial treatment 
of the meaning of the term "consumer," defendant should or 
9Evcn were it otherwise, it must be remembered that there is no excise tax 
on emplacement services. 
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could regulate thereon. Defendant has taken it upon itself 
so to do, however. Interestingly enough, its pride of authorship 
seemingly is such that its decision avoids citation of this Court's 
decisions, substituting therefor its own regulation. 
By the seventh finding of its decision, citing present Sales 
Tax Regulation 58, defendant apparently indicates reliance 
upon its regulations to support imposition of sales and use 
tax liability upon a non-consumer. It is plaintiff's position 
that, even under the regulations promulgated by defendant, 
it is not liable. 
It must be kept tn mind however that the Legislature, 
not defendant, has the power to define the subjects of taxation. 
In Western Leather & Finding Co., at 48 P.2d 528, it was 
stated: 
"The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or 
transfer to others the essential legislative function with 
which it is ... vested. The imposition of a tax and the 
designation of those who must pay the same is such 
an essential legislative function as may not be trans-
ferred to others. . . . The commission is empowered 
merely to make rules and regulations, etc., in con-
formity with the act." 
In Utah Concrete Products Corp., at 125 P.2d 412, this 
Court stated: 
"(T)he interpretation placed on the language of 
the statute by the Tax Commission must not do 
·violence to its apparent meaning .... Government 
agencies cannot deprive the courts of their judicial 
functions nor can t~e. age~cies extend the operation of 
the statute by admtntstratlve findings." 
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In point is Washington Printing & Binding Co. v. State, 
supra. A printer, who printed tariffs for a railroad bureau, was 
held to perform a "service" and not to be engaged in retail 
selling. A Washington Tax Commission collection therefore 
was refunded. The state argued that its Tax Commission had 
a regulation which expressly specified that the transactions in 
question were subject to sales tax. The Washington Supreme 
Court replied at 73 P.2d 1328: 
"The Tax Commission cannot, by such rule, impose 
a tax upon property or a transaction that is not men-
tioned as being taxable. The rule making power is 
given only for the purpose of empowering the com-
mission to carry out the provisions of the statute." 
Plaintiff may not, by regulation, make a "consumer" in 
law out of one who is not a consumer in fact. It may be that 
the imposition of a fictional standard would . be wise. Be that 
as it may, defendant is not empowered to enact such a standard. 
2. 
The Commission's Regulations Do Not Apply Retroactively 
Attention is directed to the rule set forth at 73 C.J.S. Public 
Administt'ative Bodies and Procedure, § 107, pp. 429-30. It 
is there noted that, aside from the issue of whether an agency 
may promulgate retroactive regulations: 
" (A) n administrative rule or regulation will not be 
construed to operate retrospective! y where the intention 
to that effect does not unequivocably appear .... Even 
though an administrative agency is not bound by the 
rule of res judicata . . . , it is bound to recognize the 
validity of a rule of conduct prescribed by it, and not 
to repeal its own enactment with retroactive effect." 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As has been noted, the regulation cited at paragraph 7 
of plaintiff's findings became effective on July 1, 1959 (R. 
106-107). The last date of the instant deficiency assessment, 
is June 30, 1959 (R. 108). Prior thereto the text of Regulation 
58 (R. 104-106) was as follows: 
MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES SOLD BY OWNERS, 
CONTRACTORS AND REP AIRMEN OF REAL PROPERTY 
(APPLIES TO SALES AJ\JD USE TAXES) .-Such sales may 
be classified as follows: 
I. To owners-sales are taxable-such sales are to final 
buyers and not for resale; 
II. To contractors and subcontractors for use by them in 
fulfilling contracts for erecting, building on, or otherwise 
improving, altering or repairing the real property of others: 
A. Where the contractor agrees for a lump sum to furnish 
the materials, supplies and necessary services, the sale to him 
of the materials and supplies is taxable as he becomes the 
consumer thereof or final buyer. Cost plus contracts are regarded 
as lump sum contracts for the purpose of this regulation. The 
above holding is true regardless of with whom the contract is 
drawn whether it be a governmental instrumentality or other-
wise. In connection with government contracts the following 
exemptions exist: 
1. Where the contract provides that title to the materials 
purchased shall vest in the government or instrumentality 
thereof prior to its use in the construction, the purchase by 
the contractor shall be deemed a purchase for resale and the 
contractor shall be required to obtain a sales tax license. 
2. Sales to contractors who are authorized by the United 
States Government or an instrumentality thereof to make 
purchases in the name of the government or instrumentality 
thereof are deemed to be sales to an agent of the United States 
government or the instrumentality thereof and are, therefore, 
exempt from tax. 
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Governmental contractors claiming exemption from any 
purchases made pursuant to their contract must secure a clear-
ance from the state tax commission prior to making such 
purchase. Supply houses should collect tax on all sales to 
contractors unless the contractor gives an exemption certificate 
and stipulates that proper clearance has been secured from the 
state tax commission. 
B. Where the contractor agrees to furnish the material 
and supplies at a fixed price or at the regular retail price and 
to render the services either for an additional agreed price or 
on the basis of time consumed, the sale to him of materials and 
supplies is for resale and not subject to the tax. The contractor 
then becomes the retailer and the sale by him to the owner 
is a taxable sale. In this event the final buyer is the person 
whose property is improved, altered or repaired, and the sale 
is made at the time the contract or job is completed and accepted 
by the property owner. 
In case a contractor enters into both of the above kinds of 
contracts, he shall be deemed to be a retailer or tangible per-
sonal property and shall register with the state tax commission, 
obtain a sales tax license, purchase all materials for resale 
and report his liability direct to the state tax commission. 
Contractors and repairmen who enter into contracts or 
repair work of the type referred to herein include such persons 
as building, electrical, plumbing, paper hanging, sheet metal, 
bridge, road, landscape, excavating, roofing, or similar con-
tractors or repairmen. 
Contractors or repairmen in no case should give a resale 
certificate when they purchase materials, supplies, equipment 
or other articles for their own use and consumption. Such 
purchases, which would include fuel, cement mixers, trucks, 
tractors or other machinery and equipment, are taxable to the 
seller thereof. 
This regulation is not applicable to contracts whereby the 
retailer merely agrees to sell and install a complete unit of 
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equipment under conditions whereby such unit does remain 
a chattel. In such instances the contract will not be regarded 
as one for improving, altering or repairing real property. For 
example, the maker of an awning or blinds agrees not only 
to sell them but to hang them; an electrical shop sells electrical 
fixtures and agrees to attach them; a dealer sells draperies and 
window shades and agrees to install them; a retailer sells an 
oil burner or heating equipment and contracts to install the 
same; a dealer sells linoleum and agrees to lay it; a cabinet 
maker sells show cases, counters and cabinets and agrees to 
install them; a retailer sells a sprinkling system and contracts 
to intall it. A person performing such contracts is primarily 
a retailer of tangible personal property and should segregate 
the full retail selling price of such property from the charge 
for installation, as the tax applies only to the retail price of the 
property. If such retailer fails to make such segregation on the 
customer's invoice, the sales tax applies to the entire contract 
price including the installation charge. In no case will the retail 
price be deemed less than such person charges for similar 
materials and supplies to another installer. 
Persons engaged in the foregoing types of business shall 
register with the state tax commission, obtain a sales tax license 
and report their liability directly to the state tax commission. 
If defendant's erroneous recitation of an impertinent text 
was intentional, it may have been because it wished to avoid 
the effect of the last paragraphs of the pertinent text. This 
would not be accomplished, however, even were the present 
regulations applicable. The restriction of Regulation 58 led, 
effective the same date--July 1, 1959-to the expansion of 
Regulation 51. At all times here in question, Regulation 51 
related to fabrication and machine work and had nothing to 
do with the issues at hand (R. 102). On July 1, 1959, it was 
expanded to cover not only fabrication, but also "Installation 
Labor in Connection with Retail Sales of Tangible Personal 
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Property" (R. 102-103). In substance,I0 the concept of the 
\ast paragraph of former Regulation 58 was incorporated into 
present Regulation 51, to-wit: 
"Dealers who sell tangible personal property and 
also agree to install the same on real property should 
segregate the full retail selling price of such property 
from the charge for installation as the tax applies only 
to the retail price of the property. If the retailer fails 
to make such segregation on the customer's invoice, 
the sales tax applies to the entire contract price, includ-
ing installation charges. 
"Retailers and dealers who enter into agreements of 
the type referred to above include such persons as 
dealers in awnings, draperies, window shades, heating 
equipment, carpeting, linoleum, show cases, electric 
fixtures and similar retailers." 
If defendant intends to rely upon its own regulations, it 
properly should select the right one (the one in effect at the 
time in question) . Even if defendant chooses to suggest that 
its current Regulation 58 is retroactive, it properly should cite 
Regulation 51. 
3. 
Plaintiff Sells Both Under Lump Sum and Non Lump 
Sum Contracts 
Taken literally, Regulation 58, both in its pertinent and 
present form, identifies two types of contracts into which a 
seller who installs may enter: (A) lump sum contracts, wherein 
sales price and installation price are "lumped" into a single 
IOChief auditor Holt preferred to state that the verbiage was "similar" (R. 27-
28). 
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sum; (B) non lump sum contracts, wherein there are separate 
agreements as to, respectively, the amount of the sales price 
-aed tae affiount- af the saleS" price and the amount of the 
installation price. It is undisputed that plaintiff enters into 
both types of contracts (R. 44). 
Pertinent and present Regulation 58 says, as to this type 
of dealer: "In case a contractor enters into both of the above 
kinds of contracts, he shall be deemed to be a retailer of tangible 
personal property ... " (Emphasis supplied). If plaintiff is 
a retailer, as the Regulations specify, he cannot be a consumer, 
for both the sales tax act and the use tax act define a retailer 
as a seller to the consumer, 59-15-2(e), 59-16-2(f), U.C.A., 
(1953). 
Under the plain meaning of Regulation 58, therefore, 
defendant should have deemed plaintiff a retailer, not a con-
sumer, and instructed its auditors to withdraw the instant 
assessment. 11 This Court should now do so. 
4. 
Defendant's Regulations Do Not Purport to Make 
Plaintiff a Consumer 
Insofar as plaintiff has been able to discern any theory, 
other than ipse dixit, employed by defendant in asserting 
plaintiff's liability, it is this: ( 1) the pump assemblies, upon 
emplacement, become fixtures; (2) therefore, within the mean-
llChief a~dito~· Holt would have objecte? to the instruction, for at hearing he in-
dicated his belief that the language relative to both kinds of contracts related to a 
co~1tract ~f sale followed by a. contract to install (R. 26-27). This is, of course, 
ne1ther kmd of contract prevwu~ly defined by the regulation. It is a separate 
contract of sale, followed by a hiatus, followed by a contract to install. 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ing of applicable Regulation 58 and present Regulations 58 
and 51, the pump assembly does not remain a chattel; ( 3) 
therefore, plaintiff is a "contractor" who has contracted, under 
lump sum contract, "for erection ... on, or otherwise improving 
real property of others·'; ( 4) therefore, plaintiff is a consumer. 
In the process of this theory, defendant is forced to disregard 
the "both lump sum and non lump sum" provisions of its 
regulations. 
The theory is untenable on at least two counts. 
The first fallacy of the theory is that, if it is applied, the 
regulations, either pertinent or present, are internally incon-
sistent. It is true enough that they speak in terms of chattels, 
but they then proceed to illustrate what is meant. According 
both to the pertinent regulation• and its present counterparts, 
a seller, lump sum or not, is a retailer, not a consumer, when 
he "merely agrees to sell and install a complete unit of equip-
ment under conditions whereby such unit does remain a 
chattel." As illustrations, however, the regulation specifies, 
among others, ''an electrical shop sells electrical fixtures and 
agrees to attach them; ... a retailer sells an oil burner or 
heating equipment and contracts to install the same; a dealer 
sells linoleum and agrees to lay it; a cabinet maker sells show 
cases, counters and cabinets and agrees to install them; a 
retailer sells a sprinkling system and agrees to install it." The 
pertinent regulation then adds, as if to emphasize, " (a) person 
performing such contracts is primarily a retailer of tangible 
personal property . . . " The language in current Regulation 
51 is somewhat more brief, but to substantially the same effect. 
After indicating that, in certain contracts, a retailer may "sell 
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tangible personal property and also agree to install the same 
on real property'' and still remain retailers (that is, not be 
primarily liable for tax), the illustrations of " ( r) etailers and 
dealers who enter into agreements of the type referred to 
above" include, among others, dealers in heating equipment. 
carpeting, linoleum, show. cases, electric fixtures, and simila. 
retailers. 
The inconsistency of defendant's construction of the regu-
lations is that the items mentioned therein (electric fixtures, 
heating equipment, linoleum, show cases, etc.) are ones which 
have been held, under the facts of the case, to be fixtures, or, 
put another way, to have lost their legal status as chattels upon 
installation, Anno., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1044; 22 Am fur Fixtures 
§§ 49, 55, 58. If, therefore, the regulations are taken at face 
value, they are self-defeating. They do not make sense, for 
they identify as illustrations of chattels items which may very 
well be, under the facts of a given case, fixtures. To construe 
the regulations as defendant apparently would have them 
construed, is to place them in a position in which this Court 
must disregard them because they are indefinite, uncertain, 
inconsistent, muddled and confused, hence inoperative, Toronto 
v. Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P.2d 594, 600, 604 (1950), 
and authorities there cited. 
The second fallacy of the theory is that it apparently seeks 
to substitute a "fixture" test for the "consumer" test decreed 
by the legislature. In short, defendant's apparent theory is 
that it need only determine that goods installed on realty are 
"fixtures," that is that they lose their character as "chattels" 
and that it need not determine whether the person so installing 
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is, in fact a consumer or whether the items in question (here 
pump assemblies) have lost their identity as such. As noted 
previously, defendant has no power to impose tax liability 
upon a person who does not fall within the legislative impo-
sition of liability, in this case upon a person who is not a 
consumer. Any attempt to do so by defendant is nugatory, 
for it is beyond defendant's power. 
The fallacies inherent in defendant's theory, however~ 
point to the proper construction of the pertinent regulation 
(and, for that matter, the present ones). 
It is relatively dear that the pertinent Regulation 58 and 
its successors were drafted upon the basis of Utah Concrete 
Pt"oducts Corp. They are best construed in the light of that 
decision. It will be recalled that, at 125 P.2d 410, this Court 
noted that the road and building contractors there in question 
were not reselling the products "in their original form," but 
for the "purpose of changing their very nature from personal 
to real property," that is to produce "a new entity"; again, at 
125 P.2d 411, this Court spoke in terms of the products being 
incorporated into "a separate entity" and of losing "their 
identity as such." Regulation 58, unfortunately, appears in 
its emphasis upon "chattels" to pluck from context the lan-
guage about the change of nature from personal to real property, 
dropping the key word "very" and the key term "new entity." 
When read in context, Utah Concrete Products Corp. 
speaks in terms of consumption when personal property becomes 
real property as a m,ttter of law, whatever the facts of the case. 
That is to say, when reasonable men could not disagree, despite 
the facts adduced, as to whether personalty had become realty 
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through incorporation in a new entit-y, the incorporator is the 
consumer. 
If the verbiage in defendant's regulations relative to 
chattels is read in this light, it makes sense, for (with the 
possible exception of ; sprinkling systems, fortuitously deleted 
from present Regulation 51) the items mentioned in the 
illustration have each been held, if the facts in evidence permit, 
to be other than fixtures, Anno., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1044; 22 Am. 
fur., Fixtures §§55, 68, 61. 
Whether these illustrative items are fixtures is, in other 
words, under inconclusive facts, a mixed question of law and 
fact to be decided by a jury or other finder of fact, upon which 
a decision may be rendered either way, 22 Am. fur., Fixtures 
§77, pp. 798-99. On the other hand, there are certain instances 
when the item in question becomes realty as a matter of law, 
whatever the factual context of the case. As might be expected, 
this is where, as in Utah Concrete Products Corp., "the chattel 
is so affixed to the realty that its identity is lost, or where it 
cannot be removed without material injury to the realty or to 
itself . . . " (emphasis supplied), Bay State York Co. v . 
. Marvix, 331 Mass. 407, 119 N.E. 2d 727, 43 A.L.R. 2d 1373, 
1377 (1954). 
It is submitted that defendant's regulations are consistent, 
both in internal context and with the Legislative mandate and 
this Court's decisions, if-but only if-they are read to mean 
that the sale and installation of a chattel is, for sales and use 
tax purposes, a retail sale unless the chattel installed becomes 
a part of the real estate as a matter of law., whatever the un-
disputed facts. 
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\v' ater pumps, when emplaced and whatever the facts, 
certainly are not a part of the real estate as a matter of law. 
To the contrary, they have been held to remain personalty 
after emplacement, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Morgan, 
42 Kan. 23, 21 Pac. 809 ( 1889). It has been demonstrated 
previously that plaintiff, in the subject transactions, was not 
a consumer within the definitions afforded by Utah decisions, 
including Utah Concrete Products Corp. It should be added 
that the undisputed testimony is that no damage is caused to 
the real estate when a pump is removed (R. 54), that a given 
well can receive various sized pumps (R. 95), and that a given 
pump can be removed from a well and resold for use in another 
well (R. 56). 
Under pertinent and present regulations, as properly con-
strued, plaintiff is not a consumer. If such regulations are not 
interpreted as suggested they are void because inconsistent 
and because their promulgation is beyond the power of 
defendant. 
s. 
Defendant's Theory Does Not Make Plaintiff a Consumer 
Even if defendant's regulations are read as defendant 
apparently would have them read (that is, by assuming the 
legal validity of the "fixture" test, and by deleting the "both 
lump sum and non lump sum" contract provision and the 
illustrations as to chattels), plaintiff was not a consumer. Even 
if the "fixture" test is adopted, the evidence of record establishes 
beyond any doubt which might be entertained by reasonable 
men that the pump assemblies in question remained chattels 
after emplacement. 
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The tests for determining whether an article becomes a 
"fixture" were set forth succinctly by this Court in Workman 
tJ. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033, 1035, 58 A.L.R. 1346 
(1928): 
"In considering whether a structure annexed to land 
is itself legally a part of the land, the chief determining 
factors are the mode of attachment or annexation, the 
character of the structure and the intention of the 
person making the annexation, which generally is re-
garded as the most important or controlling factor, 
and the mode of annexation and the character of the 
structure merely as evidence on the question of inten-
tion.'' 
The evidence shows: 
(1) As to intention. Neither the seller, the buyer nor the 
buyer's consulting engineer intend that the water pump shall 
constitute a permanent addition to the well. To the contrary, 
they all contemplate that its removal will be necessary for one 
or more of the five reasons set forth heretofore. Objectively, 
engineers plan water well construction to facilitate pump 
removal, buyers assume that pump houses have a hatch so 
removal can be effected and plaintiff, when emplacing pumps, 
lubricates the platform so that it will not be cemented by the 
grouting to the foundation. Additionally, plaintiff, in its 
private dealings, utilizes conditional sale contracts and has 
repossessed thereunder, but has neved filed a mechanic's lien 
-once more an objective fact which demonstrates an intention 
that pumps remain personalty. Moreover, the very fact that 
plaintiff has not paid the excise taxes levied on consumers, but 
has charged sales tax to private buyers, coupled with assurances 
from public purchasers that no tax liability would accrue, is 
an objective indication of intent. 
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(2) As to annexation: Pumps are annexed so passingly 
to the realty that no damage thereto is done when they are 
removed. Although pumps are objects of considerable weight, 
all parties concerned are aware that plaintiff has (as do other 
dealers) facilities by which to remove them with relative ease. 
Constructive annexation, based upon unique suitability for 
the real estate, is not applicable. A pump can service any of a 
number of wells. A well can be served by any of a number 
of pumps. 
(3) Character of the object: A pump, unlike auditor Buttalph's 
doors and windows (footnote & ) , is a machine with moving 
parts which experiences considerable wear. Its life span in 
Utah is, at most 20 years, and probably less. It is recommended 
that pumps be removed every 5-7 years for a prev~ntive main-
tenance check, and more frequent removal, for one of the 
reasons before recited, is likely. 
The language of Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, supra, is 
once again in point. It is clear that the pumps in question, after 
emplacement, remained chattels. This could not be doubted by 
reasonable men. It is significant that defendant's decision 
contains no finding relative to the issue of fixtures. Even under 
defendant's apparent theory, plaintiff was not a consumer. 
6. 
Defendant Erred in Not Allowing Cross-Examination and 
Not Admitting Exhibit 15 for Identification. 
As just noted, plaintiff's non-payment of the tax required 
\\·ere it a consumer and its collection from private customers 
of sales tax is an objective indication of the intent that pumps, 
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after emplacement, remain personalty. Defendant's refusal to 
allow plaintiff to cross-examine regarding uniform trade 
practice in this regard (R. 36-3 7) and its refusal to admit 
a stipulation to the effect that other dealers, experts in the 
field, have uniformly considered sale and emplacement of 
pumps to be retail sales of personal property (R. 74-75, 122, 
Ex. 15) constituted error. As noted at 20 Am. fur., Evidence 
§334, p. 311, custom or usage is properly admissible in order 
to ascertain the intention of parties to a contract. In this case, 
a pertinent issue, if defendant's own theory is adopted, was 
and is the intention of the parties to a contract as to the 
character of the goods thereafter. Uniform trade practice, 
custom and opinion is of importance to these issues. Defendant 
erred. Such evidence should be considered by this Court. 
II. 
PENALTIES WERE IMPROPERLY ASSESSED. 
A. 
PLAINTIFF WAS NEITHER NEGLIGENT NOR INTENTIONALLY 
DISREGARDFUL OF AUTHORIZED RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH 
KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. 
Defendant has assessed plaintiff not only with a tax de-
ficiency, but also with penalties (including 12% per annum 
interest) thereon. The statutory provisions in point are 59-15-S 
and 59-16-9, U.C.A. (1953). 
Ordinarily, if deficiency exists, interest at 6% per annum 
is charged from the time the return was due. If, ho'"'~'ever, the 
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deficiency, or any part thereof, is due to negligence or inten-
tional disregard of authorized rules and regulations with 
t\:nowledge thereof, a flat 10% penalty, plus an additional 6% 
per annum interest, is charged. Although in its decision 
defendant made no finding that plaintiff's failure was due to 
negligence or intentional disregard of authorized rules and 
regulations with knowledge thereof, defendant affirmed the 
imposition of penalties. 
The purported reason why the auditing department 
originally imposed the penalties is fairly apparent from the 
record. Chief auditor Holt was of the opinion that failure to 
report use tax liability on the transactions in question, inasmuch 
as the liability, according to him, was "clear cut," was sufficient 
indication of neglect or intentional disregard (R. 22-24). Mr. 
Holt, who did not go through plaintiff's books (R. 22), who 
did not visit the wells in question, who had not talked to 
persons and firms in the pump business, and who had not talked 
either to buyers or engineers (R. 29), had depended upon the 
report of auditor Buttalph (R. 24). Auditor Buttalph had 
never examined the pumps in question, but asserted familiarity 
with pumps in general; he claimed to have talked with engi-
neers, but not the ones involved in the instant transactions; 
he had not talked to the buyers in question (R. 35-37). 
Why defendant affirmed such assessment of penalty 
(including augmented interest) is less clear. As noted, there 
is no finding in support. Some indication would have been 
appreciated by plaintiff, particularly in view of the following 
statement of the hearing officer (and the only member of 
the bar on the Commission), which statement was made without 
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objection from any Commission member, all of whom were 
present: 
COMMISSIONER SMART: I think that you have 
made your case, that the penalty in this case based upon 
willful neglect or negligence is an improper charge. 
I feel you have made your case in respect to that inas-
much as there is primarily in dispute here a question 
as to whether this sale to a tax exempt organization, 
as to whether or not a reasonable doubt in the mind 
of the Nickerson Pump Company as to whether it was 
actually taxable and as to the penalty. I think you 
have made your case and I am sure that the Commis-
sion will agree that in any event that would be waived 
regardless of the outcome with respect to the other 
... (R. 36). 
It seems clear that there is not any rational basis upon 
which plaintiff may be found to have been negligent or inten-
tionally disregardful of authorized rules and regulations of 
which it had notice. As to the specification of tax at Exhibit A, 
Schedule 1 of the deficiency notice, there is no evidence what-
ever. Surely negligence or intentional disregard cannot be 
presumed. From the sums involved, it would appear that 
bookkeeping errors were involved at the average of slightly 
over 5 a year, less than one a month. Defendant would be 
ill-advised to label this wrongdoing. If it is, what of auditor 
Buttalph who on the instant audit made four admitted errors 
(R. 4, 10-12, 108), two more errors stipulated to at hearing 
(R. 21, 22), and another error apparent on the face of the 
record (R. 60) ? Insofar as the bulk of the deficiency is con-
cerned, Commissioner Smart's summary, quoted heretofore, 
adequately expresses plaintiff's view. In view of the status of 
the law, of the status of the Commission's regulations, of the 
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assurances of tax exemption from public buyers and, appar-
ently, of a prior contrary practical interpretation by defendant, 
plaintitc·s failure to pay the asserted tax is precisely what one 
would expect of a reasonable man. If this is a proper case for 
imposition of penalties, one wonders what case is not. 
A test exists for determination of negligence or intentional 
disregard. Mr. Nickerson's stipulated testimony was that he 
had regularly directed his bookkeeper to file sales and use tax 
returns as required (R. 43). If such bookkeeper had access to 
all files examined by auditor Buttolph, was the bookkeeper 
negligent or intentionally disregardful of authorized rules and 
regulations of which he had knowledge so that, if the decision 
of this Court is adverse, plaintiff herein many recover its loss 
from its bookkeeper? A similar test might be formulated. 
Assume that prior to July 1, 1955, Mr. Nickerson contacted 
an attorney, who advised him to treat the transactions, from 
the tax standpoint, as they were treated. Would such attorney, 
in the event of an adverse decision, be held liable to plaintiff 
because of negligence or intentional disregard? The answer 
to both questions is clearly no. The penalties (including aug-
mented interest) are improper. 
B. 
DEFENDANT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING CROSS-EXAMINATION 
AND NOT ADMITTING EXHIBIT 15 FOR IDENTIFICATON. 
This matter has been considered relative to the intention 
facet of the fixture issue. The matter of penalties raises a 
question of whether plaintiff was negligent. It is well estab-
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lished that trade custom may be introduced or elicited in order 
to establish a standard of care, 1 Jones on Evidence (Fifth 
Edition) § 192. The fact that all plaintiff's competitors treated 
like transactions in the same manner as did plaintiff was of 
importance. The cross-examination should have been allowed 
and the evidence admitted. The hearing officer apparently 
would have allowed the testimony and evidence, had he con-
sidered the matter of penalties open to dispute (R. 36, 3 7). 
Failure to do so was error, which this Court may purge by 
affording the evidence due consideration in its review of the 
facts herein. 
III. 
CERTAIN TERMS OF THE ASSESSMENT WERE IN-
CORRECTLY IMPOSED. 
The following list deals with errors in the deficiency notice 
prepared by defendant's auditors (R. 108, Ex. 1) and affirmed 
by defendant. Even if defendant's decision is otherwise affirmed, 
defendant should be ordered to correct them. 
1. The amount upon which tax was based was amended 
and reduced, by stipulation at hearing by the amount of $239.59 
(R. 21-22). The decision did not reflect this stipulation and 
reduction. 
2. Even if defendant's apparent theory is correct, all items 
attributable to Midvale City, No. 8833 (R. 60-61) should be 
eliminated. According to the undisputed evidence, neither a 
lump sum, nor a separately itemized contract was entered into 
in this transaction. Rather, two separate contracts, with a hiatus 
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in time between them, were entered into, one for sale and the 
other for installation. 
3. Defendant erred in its computation of sales tax penalties 
at Exhibit A of Exhibit 1 (R. 108). It assessed the penalties 
year by year, resulting in two years wherein the statutory 
minimum of $2.50 rather than 10% was applied. 59-15-8 
U.C.A. ( 1953) makes the minimum applicable only to the 
entire deficiency, not on a year by year basis. 
4. Assuming arguendo the correctness of defendant's 
apparent theory, plaintiff is responsible for sales tax on all 
goods title to which passed to it in Utah and is responsible for 
use tax on all goods title to which passed to it outside Utah. 
Regulation 31, both before and after its 1956 amendment, 
rules that: ''If the contract of sale requires the seller to deliver 
the goods to the buyer at a particular place or to pay the freight 
or cost of transportation to the buyer at a particular place, 
title to the property does not pass until the goods have been 
so delivered to the buyer or have reached the place agreed 
upon" (R. 102). In this case all materials, save those from 
Cutler Hammer, are shipped postage prepaid by the seller. 
Byron Jackson, however, stipulates that title passes F.O.B. its 
factory, California, and both Byron Jackson and Aurora provide 
specialty goods (goods to order), thereby passing title outside 
Utah upon appropriation to the contract, 60-2-3 ( 4) (a), 
U.C.A. ( 1953). As to all materials save those purchased from 
Cutler-Hammer, Byron Jackson and Aurora and listed at 
Schedule 4, title passed to plaintiff within, not without Utah. 
The use tax as to those items is incorrectly assessed. They should 
be deleted from the assessment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff was not, under the largely stipulated and un-
disputed evidence, a consumer of the water pumps in question. 
Water pumps are consumed or exhausted through the wear 
entailed in pumping water, not through emplacement by 
plaintiff. Neither does plaintiff's emplacement of such pumps 
create a new entity. Neither is plaintiff a consumer under 
defendant's regulations nor under its apparent theory. 
Judgment should be entered for plaintiff with, as in 
Western Leather & Finding Co., costs awarded to it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kent Shearer 
Earl M. Wunderli 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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